Tax Increment Financing: A New Source of Funds for Community Redevelopment in Illinois - People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch by Molinaro, Michael L.
Masthead Logo DePaul Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 2 Winter 1981 Article 11
Tax Increment Financing: A New Source of Funds
for Community Redevelopment in Illinois - People
ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch
Michael L. Molinaro
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review
by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact wsulliv6@depaul.edu, c.mcclure@depaul.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael L. Molinaro, Tax Increment Financing: A New Source of Funds for Community Redevelopment in Illinois - People ex rel. City of
Canton v. Crouch, 30 DePaul L. Rev. 459 (1981)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol30/iss2/11
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING:
A NEW SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR COMMUNITY
REDEVELOPMENT IN ILLINOIS-
PEOPLE EX REL. CITY OF CANTON V. CROUCH
Traditionally, municipalities acquired funds for community redevelop-
ment either by enlisting federal assistance or by raising tax rates. ' As federal
appropriations for redevelopment decline2 and as increased tax rates become
unpopular,3 municipalities have been forced to seek alternative methods for
financing redevelopment. To supply municipalities with a new source of
funds, the Illinois General Assembly in 1977 enacted the Real Property Tax
Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act. 4  The Act authorizes tax incre-
ment financing to obtain redevelopment funds. Such funds are acquired
from the increase in the real property tax revenue generated as the property
is developed and increases in value.5
Recently, the constitutionality of the Act was challenged. In People ex rel.
City of Canton v. Crouch," a case of first impression, 7 the Illinois Supreme
1. See S. LAFER, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 49-61 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as LAFEI]; Davidson, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community Redevelop-
ment, 56 J. URB. L. 405 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Davidson]; Henderson, Local Money, Local
Control: The Tax-Increment Road to Urban Renewal, ILL. IssUEs, June, 1980, at 16 [hereinafter
cited as Henderson].
2. Actual federal outlays for community and regional development for 1979 decreased to
$9.482 billion from $11.039 billion in 1978. Projected federal outlays for community and
regional development indicate a further decrease to $8.467 billion in 1980 and to $8.820 billion
in 1981. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BuDGEr, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, H.R. Doc. No. 96-246, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 604 (1980) (fiscal year 1981).
3. The public's most forceful objection to increasing property taxes was the passage of
Proposition 13 in California. Proposition 13 restricts state and local governments' ability to tax
real property by establishing a maximum tax rate and by limiting the assessed value of real
property. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA §§ 1-6.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-74.4-1 to -11 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Act]. See
notes 18-36 and accompanying text infra for an explanation of the Act's provisions.
In addition to Illinois, twenty-three states have authorized the use of tax increment financing
to raise funds for urban redevelopment. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.695 (1974); Afnz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-1488.01 (Supp. 1980); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33670-33677 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-25-801 to -822 (1973 & Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-134(a) (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.387 (West Supp. 1980); IND. CODE
ANN. § 18-7-7-39.1 (Burns Supp. 1979); IowA CODE ANN. § 403.19 (West 1976); KAN. STAT,
ANN. § 12-1775 (Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4864 (1978); MicHi. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 125.1664-65 (West 1976 & Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 472A.01-.13 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-3921 (Supp. 11 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 279.676
(1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-46-45 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-58-20 (Supp. 1979); On. REV.
STAT. §§ 457.420-.460 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 11-9-1 to -47 (Supp. 1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-20-205 (1980); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066d (Vernon Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-19-29 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.46 (West Supp. 1980 & Supp.
1981); Wyo. STAT. § 15-10-121 (1977).
5. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text infra.
6. 79 111. 2d 356, 403 N.E.2d 242 (1980) (per curiam).
7. Other jurisdictions have ruled on the constitutionality of state statutes providing for the
use of tax increment financing to fund urban redevelopment. See note 98 infra.
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Court held that the use of tax increment financing as prescribed in the Act
was constitutionally sound." In so doing, the court provided municipalities
throughout Illinois with a flexible tool for community redevelopment.,
This Note analyzes the court's reasoning in Crouch and evaluates the use of
tax increment financing as a source of funds for community renewal in
Illinois. It not only demonstrates that the Illinois Supreme Court was justi-
fied in finding the Act constitutional, but also establishes that tax increment
financing is an effective method for funding redevelopment.
BACKGROUND
Tax Increment Financing
Real property taxes are computed by multiplying the property's equalized
assessed value1 ° by the tax rate.' As redevelopment of a substandard area
takes place, the equalized assessed value of the refurbished property in that
area rises, pushing up property taxes attributable to that area.
Under a tax increment financing scheme, the increase in tax revenue
resulting from redevelopment is known as the tax increment. 2 This incre-
8. 79 Ill. 2d at 363, 403 N.E.2d at 245.
9. See notes 99-121 and accompanying text infra.
10. The Illinois Constitution requires that real property taxes shall be levied according to the
value of the property. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a). See note 80 infra for the text of this provision
of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois General Assembly has determined that, in general, real
property shall be valued at 331/3 %of its fair cash value. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501 (1979). So
that property is in fact assessed at this value, statutes provide that reported property valuations,
both within each county, id. § 589.1, and between each county, id. § 627, are adjusted by an
equalizing factor. The Illinois Constitution, however, allows counties with a population of more
than 200,000 to determine their own valuation procedures for the taxation of real property. ILL.
CONST. art. IX, § 4(b).
11. After the equalized assessed value of all real property has been determined, a tax rate is
calculated and imposed to generate enough revenue to meet the needs of state and local
government. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 634-638 (1979).
12. For general discussions of the operation of tax increment financing, see COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, CSG RESEARCH
BRIEF (1977) [hereinafter cited as COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS]; LAFER, supra note 1;
Davidson, supra note 1; Hegg, Tax-Increment Financing of Urban Renewal-Redevelopment
Incentive Without Federal Assistance, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 575 (1973); Note, Urban Redevelop-
ment: Utilization of Tax Increment Financing, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 536 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Urban Redevelopment].
For discussions of the operation of tax increment financing in Illinois, see BARTON-ASCHMAN
ASSOCIATES, INC., TAX INCREMENT FINANCING OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (1973) (a report on a
conference held in Chicago which analyzed the implementation of tax increment financing in
other jurisdictions and explored the utilization of tax increment financing in Illinois); Hender-
son, supra note 1 (analysis of tax increment financing in Canton and other cities in Illinois);
Nebel, Chicago Redevelopment Can Succeed, 12TH ANN. METROPOLITAN CHICAGO INDUS./CoM.
DEV. GUIDE, July, 1978, at 50 (discussion of tax increment financing as a new means to
accomplish redevelopment in Chicago); Nebel & Teplitz, Tax Increment Financing, ILL. HoRn-
ZONS, July/August, 1977, at 6 (explanation of the operation of the Act) [hereinafter cited as Nebel
& Teplitz].
For analyses of tax increment financing, see Jefferson & Taggart, Tax Increments Criticized,
32 J. Hous. 5 (1975) (criticizing) [hereinafter cited as Jefferson & Taggart]; Mitchell, Tax
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ment is allocated to a special fund controlled by the municipality. The
property tax revenue accumulated in this fund can be used to pay for
redevelopment projects directly or to retire tax increment bonds.' 3 Munici-
palities often prefer to issue tax increment bonds because the bond proceeds
are immediately available to pay redevelopment costs, such as write down,14
relocation, 15 and public improvements."'
Tax increment financing is unique because it requires each taxing district
overlapping the redevelopment project area to allocate its tax increment to
Increment Financing For Redevelopment, 34 J. Hous. 226 (1977) (generally supporting) [herein-
after cited as Mitchell]; Swick, Tax Increments Supported, 32 J. Hous. 52 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Swick]; Trimble, Tax Increment Financing For Redevelopment: California Experience
Is Good, 31 J. Hous. 485 (1974) (generally supporting).
13. The following example illustrates how tax increment financing works:
Within X city there exist five acres of land fronting a major river which bisects the
community. The land is presently occupied by an automobile junkyard and repre-
sents a blighting factor. Its use as a junkyard frustrates X city's efforts to upgrade its
river frontage and make the area available for inner-city housing. To achieve these
urban renewal goals, the community wishes to undertake a tax increment financed
redevelopment project based on the following figures:
Cost of acquisition, relocation, demolition, administration, and
site improvements $ 500,000
Less
Cash received from resale of land $ 200,000
Net cost of project to be financed through the sale of
tax-increment bonds $ 300,000
Original taxable value of junkyard $ 100,000
Original tax revenue received $ 3,000
New taxable value created from redevelopment of the parcel by
construction of 200 dwelling units of housing $3,000,000
New annual tax revenue received $ 90,000
Net annual increase (increment created through redevelopment) $ 87,000
Bond repayment 4 years
All taxing bodies continue to receive the original tax revenue ($3,000) derived
from the original taxable value ($100,000) as if the junkyard still existed. The
increment ($87,000) in tax revenue is segregated and allocated for the repayment of
the bonds issued for undertaking the redevelopment project.
Hegg, Tax-Increment Financing of Urban Renewal-Redevelopment Incentive Without Fed-
eral Assistance, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 575, 575-76 (1973).
14. Write down is a redevelopment cost representing the difference between a city's cost in
acquiring the blighted property and the proceeds received from a private developer upon sale of
the property. A city will often sell the property for less than the purchase price in order to
encourage development. Davidson, supra note 1, at 409 n.20 (citing MINN. OFFICE OF LOCAL &
UaB. AFvs., TAx INCREMENT FINANCING FOR MINNESOTA COMMUNITIES 1-2 (1973)).
15. Relocation refers to the costs incurred to assist present residents to move to a new
location.
16. A city will often make improvements, such as streets, sidewalks, sewers, and parks, to
attract private investment.
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the municipality."7 In a typical redeveloped area, there are various taxing
districts-county, park district, school district, and city. Each of these dis-
tricts will continue to receive property tax revenue based on the assessed
property value before redevelopment. The increased tax revenue attributable
to the redevelopment project, however, will be paid to the municipality.
Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act
The Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act estab-
lished specific procedures to implement tax increment financing in Illinois.
Under the Act, a municipality initially must determine that the statutory
conditions for either a blighted area" or a conservation area"0 exist,20 and
must demonstrate that revitalization has not occurred, and will not occur,
through private investment without the assistance of a redevelopment
plan.2' If both of these factors are present, the municipality may propose an
overall redevelopment plan as well as specific redevelopment projects2 2 for
17. Another unique aspect of tax increment financing is that it combines the features of
revenue bonds and special assessment taxation. Davidson, supra note 1, at 413. Revenue bonds
finance public improvements by pledging the anticipated income arising from the use of the
public improvement to the retirement of the bonds. They usually are used when demands for
particular services exist, such as toll bridges or utility improvements. Special assessment taxation,
on the other hand, finances public improvements by taxing property owners who benefit directly
from the improvements. For example, the installation of sewers in a specified district could be
paid for by a tax levy on property owners in that district. 15 E. MCQuILLIN, TIlE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 43.34-35 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as McQuiLLIN].
18. A "blighted area" is an area which is "detrimental to the public safety, health, morals, or
welfare" because of a combination of five or more of the following factors: age; dilapidation;
obsolescence; deterioration; presence of structures below minimum code standards; lack of
ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities; lack of community planning; inadequate utilities; delete-
rious land use or layout. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-74.4-3(a) (1979).
19. A "conservation area" is an area in which 50% or more of the structures have an age of
35 years or greater. Such an area is not yet blighted, but is "detrimental to the public safety,
health, morals, or welfare" because of a combination of three or more of the following factors:
dilapidation; obsolescence; deterioration; presence of structures below minimum code standards;
lack of ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities; lack of community planning; inadequate utilities;
deleterious land use or layout. Id. § 11-74.4-3(b).
20. Id. § 11-74.4-3(h).
21. Id. § 11-74.4-3(f. A "redevelopment plan" is a municipality's comprehensive program
for redevelopment intended to eliminate those conditions that qualified the redevelopment
project area as a blighted or conservation area and thereby to enhance the tax bases of the taxing
districts within the project area. Id.
22. A "redevelopment project" is any development project in furtherance of the objectives of
a redevelopment plan. Id. § 11-74.4-3(g).
The formation of redevelopment plans and projects requires extensive municipal planning.
Nebel & Teplitz, supra note 12, at 7. A municipality must evaluate project costs as well as
sources of funds. Id. Moreover, a municipality must be sure that the funds will be available at
the proper time to pay redevelopment costs. Id. Careful attention should be given to the timing
involved in redevelopment plans. Thus, a municipality should obtain a binding commitment
from private investors before issuing tax increment bonds so the investors cannot impede the
plan's success by unexpectedly withdrawing from the project. Id.
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the targeted project area. 23 Both the plan and the projects must conform to
the comprehensive development scheme for the entire community. 24
Public hearings are required to resolve the objections of interested persons
and affected taxing districts, 25 before a municipality may introduce ordi-
nances approving the redevelopment plan and redevelopment projects and
designating the redevelopment project area. 2  Upon enacting these ordi-
nances, a municipality may introduce an ordinance establishing tax incre-
ment financing. 27  If this ordinance is approved, the municipality acquires
broad discretionary power to implement the redevelopment plan.28 The Act
expressly authorizes a municipality (1) to enter into contracts, 2  (2) to ac-
quire, sell, lease, demolish, rehabilitate, or construct any structure within
the project area, 30 (3) to create a supervisory commission,3" and (4) to issue
bonds to finance project costs.3 2
After adoption of tax increment financing, the county clerk must calculate
the most recent (initial) equalized assessed value of all real property in the
23. A "redevelopment project area" is an area not less than one and one-half acres in which
the municipality has found that there exist conditions which cause the area to be classified as a
blighted or conservation area. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-74.4-3(h) (1979).
24. Id. § 11-74.4-3(f). The wording of the Act pertaining to redevelopment plans, projects,
and project areas is somewhat circular. It appears from one section of the Act that the redevelop-
ment plan should be formulated before the redevelopment project area is designated. Id. §
11-74.4-4. Another section makes the opposite appear true. Id. § 11-74.4-3(f). According to Kai
Allen Nebel, a Chicago attorney who drafted the Act with Jack L. Teplitz, although there is
need for a municipality to make studies to determine that blighted conditions exist in an area
being considered for redevelopment, the Act requires that municipalities first approve the
redevelopment plan and project and then designate the redevelopment project area. The purpose
of this sequence of action is to prevent municipalities from characterizing an area as blighted and
then not taking prompt remedial action. Experience with urban renewal projects under federal
law and prior state law indicated to the authors of the legislation that the designation of an area
as a conservation area without the implementation of remedial action tends to become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. The Act, therefore, requires "the cure to be administered at the time of
the diagnosis of the illness." Interview with Kai Allen Nebel (Sept. 4, 1980).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-74.4-5 (1979). The Act requires that notice of the public
hearing be given twice by publication during the 30 days before the hearing. Additionally,
notice by mailing is required to be given to all affected taxing districts and to those people who
paid the property taxes in the last year for each lot in the redevelopment project area. Id.
§ 11-74.4-6.
26. Id. § 11-74.4-4(a). Before the adoption of any redevelopment ordinance, changes can be
made which "do not alter the exterior boundaries" or "substantially change the nature of the
redevelopment project," provided that notice is given by mailing to the taxing districts and by
publication. After the adoption of any of the redevelopment ordinances, "no ordinance shall be
adopted altering the exterior boundaries, affecting the general land use established pursuant to
the plan, or changing the nature of the redevelopment project" without first complying with the
procedures for public hearing and notice. Id. § 11-74.4-5.
27. Id. § 11-74.4-8.
28. Id. § 11-74.4-4(a) to -4(h).
29. Id. § 11-74.4-4(b).
30. Id. § 11-74.4(c) to -4(e).
31. Id. § 11-74.4-4(k).
32. Id. § 11-74.4-7. The term of the bonds may not exceed 20 years. A municipality secures
repayment of the bonds by pledging the revenue in the tax allocation fund. However, it may also
pledge revenue from the redevelopment project, the municipality's real property tax revenue,
the full faith and credit of the municipality, a mortgage on the redevelopment project, and other
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project area. 3   Each year thereafter, real property taxes attributable to the
initial equalized assessed value are paid to the various taxing districts in the
same manner and proportion as before the adoption of tax increment financ-
ing. The portion of the taxes attributable to the current equalized assessed
value over the initial equalized assessed value is allocated to the municipality
to pay for redevelopment costs or obligations. 34
After project costs have been paid, the Act requires the municipality to
adopt an ordinance terminating the tax allocation fund and the redevelop-
ment project area. 35 Thereafter, the affected taxing districts will receive tax
revenue calculated on the current equalized assessed value of the property
and distributed in the same manner and proportion as before the implemen-
tation of tax increment financing.3
The Canton Redevelopment Project
Canton, a city of 15,000 persons, is located in central Illinois. Its redevel-
opment project area covers nine square blocks in the downtown section of
the city. 37 Most buildings in this area were constructed more than thirty-five
years ago, 38 centered around a town square .3  These deteriorated, dilapi-
dated structures40 made the district unattractive to private investors, particu-
larly because the buildings contained structural deficiencies,4 the land plat-
ting was obsolete, 42 and the area lacked adequate public facilities. 43
taxes that the municipality may legally pledge. Further, the bonds are not subject to statutory
debt limitations. Id.
33. Id. § 11-74.4-9.
34. Id. §§ 11-74.4-8(a) to -(b). The tax revenue is deposited in a "special tax allocation fund."
Id. § 11-74.4-8(b). Any surplus funds raised by this system are distributed annually and upon
final payment of redevelopment project costs to the various taxing districts within the redevelop-
ment project area. Id. §§ 11-74.4-7, -8(b). Surplus funds are amounts in the special tax allocation
which are not pledged to pay for redevelopment project costs. Id. § 11-74.4-7.
35. Id. § 11-74.4-8(b).
36. Id.
37. Brief for Appellant at 15, People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356, 403
N.E.2d 242 (1980).
38. Id. Eighty-nine percent of these buildings were over 35 years old, and many were built
before 1900. Id.
39. Henderson, supra note 1, at 18.
40. Seventy-three percent of these buildings contained structural defects or other defects
which cannot be corrected through normal maintenance. Brief for Appellant at 15-16. In
addition, many buildings were seriously damaged by fires in 1973 and by a tornado in 1975. Id.
at 17.
41. Id. at 16. Typically, these buildings had excessive heating costs due to high ceilings and
poorly fitted windows, heating systems which are not easily adaptable to central air condition-
ing, inadequate plumbing facilities, and no elevators or escalators. Id.
42. The redevelopment area contained 125 parcels under separate ownership, many of
which were 25 feet or less in width and 150 feet or more in depth. Id. This disproportionate
width to depth ratio stifled modern development which prefers extended frontage exposure.
Only a few of the parcels in the area possessed the requisite size and shape for new construction.
Id.
43. Id. at 17. The streets in the area are congested with traffic due to a lack of public parking
and merchandise loading zones. Id.
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The combination of these factors caused the real property value in the area
to decline substantially. 4  Attempting to counteract this trend, Canton
formulated a redevelopment plan that provided for three privately financed
developments: a retail outlet, 65,000 square-foot retail shopping complex,
and expansion of an existing medical clinic.45 To facilitate the commercial
development, the plan also provided for construction of public improve-
ments, including parking lots, streets, lights, and parks.4
THE COURT'S DEcISION
In 1978, the City of Canton approved the redevelopment plan and proj-
ects, and designated a project area. 47 A controversy arose, however, when
the mayor refused to execute the tax increment bonds because there was
doubt about the "validity, interpretation and constitutionality" of the Real
Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act. 48  The Canton City
Council petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the mayor to execute
the bonds, 49 and both parties moved for summary judgment. The Circuit
Court of Fulton County entered summary judgment for the city.50
Thereafter, the action was appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b). 51 Although Mayor Crouch al-
leged that the Act violated the Illinois Constitution on several different
grounds,52 the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the Act did not exceed
44. Id. The initial equalized assessed value of the property in the redevelopment area is
$2,473,977. As a result of the redevelopment project, it is anticipated that the equalized assessed
value will increase to $5,682,158. Based on a current tax rate of $6.615 per $100.00 of assessed
value, the increase in assessed value of $3,208,181 will produce $211,740 of tax increment
revenue each year. It is anticipated that the tax increment revenue will support the issuance and
retirement of $2.4 million of tax increment allocation bonds. Id. at 18-19.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id.; Henderson, supra note 1, at 18.
47. Brief for Appellant at 14. Canton also authorized the sale of $50,000 of tax increment
allocation bonds. Id. The taxing districts affected by the redevelopment project were the County
of Fulton, Canton Township, Canton Park District, Spoon River College District, Canton Union
School District No. 66, and the City of Canton. 79 IIl. 2d, at 362, 403 N.E.2d at 245.
48. 79 111. 2d at 359, 403 N.E.2d at 244.
49. Id. at 359, 403 N.E.2d at 243.
50. Id. at 359-60, 403 N.E.2d at 244.
51. Id. at 360, 403 N.E.2d at 244. Rule 302(b) provides for a direct appeal from a circuit
court to the Illinois Supreme Court when matters of public interest require expeditious determi-
nation. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 302(b) (1979).
52. The mayor contended that the Act violated the public purpose doctrine, due process,
equal protection, and uniformity. For an analysis of the court's opinion concerning these claims,
see notes 55-73 and accompanying text infra. The mayor's other claims were dismissed by the
court. These claims were trivial and do not warrant a detailed analysis. First, it was alleged that
the Act was vague and as a result constituted an improper delegation of legislative authority and
violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court held that the Act was not unconstitution-
ally vague because it identified the harm to be prevented (urban blight) and the means available
to the municipality to prevent the harm (e.g., eminent domain, issuance of bonds, sale or lease of
property). Since the Act was not vague, the court concluded that the Act did not constitute an
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any constitutional provisions.5 3 The court's opinion addressed two major
issues: (1) whether the allocation of the tax increment was an unconstitu-
tional violation of the requirement that taxing districts only expend public
funds for a public purpose, 54 and (2) whether the allocation of the tax
increment constituted an improper diversion of tax revenue from the taxing
districts to the municipality.
The court responded to the first issue by noting that the elimination of
blighted conditions, as proposed in the Act, has long been considered a valid
public purpose. 55 Moreover, the court reaffirmed its position in People ex
rel. City of Urbana v. Paley56 that the stimulation of commercial and eco-
nomic development also falls within the scope of the public purpose doc-
trine.5 7  As to the allocation of tax increments by the taxing districts, the
court emphasized that the constitution requires that public funds be spent for
a public purpose, but not necessarily the corporate purpose of the taxing
improper delegation of legislative authority or violate the separation of powers doctrine. 79 I11.
2d at 372-74, 403 N.E.2d at 250. Second, it was claimed that the Governor's recommendations
for change of the Act exceeded his amendatory veto power, which allows him to make specific
recommendations for change of a proposed statute, but not to substitute an entirely new bill.
The court determined that the Governor's changes in the Act did not exceed his amendatory veto
power because the changes did not alter the essential purpose or intent of the Act. Id. at 375-76,
403 N.E.2d at 251. Third, it was contended that the Act amended various laws without
indicating what sections were amended. The court concluded that the Act was not unconstitu-
tional because it is not necessary for a new act to set forth all prior acts modified by implication.
Id. at 376-77, 403 N.E.2d at 252.
Additionally, the court refused to decide a fourth trivial claim, that the Act would impair the
obligation of the taxing districts' contracts in the future, because that issue was not raised at trial.
Id. at 374-75, 403 N.E.2d at 251.
53. 79 I11. 2d at 363, 403 N.E.2d at 245.
54. See note 81 infra for the relevant portion of the Illinois Constitution.
55. 79 Ill. 2d at 364, 403 N.E.2d at 245-46. In People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago,
414 I11. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953), the constitutionality of a 1949 amendment to the Blighted
Areas Redevelopment Act of 1947 was questioned. The amendment expanded the scope of the
1947 act to include land which was unmarketable for housing or other economic purposes due to
obsolete land platting, diversity of ownership, deterioration of structures, or tax delinquencies.
The court held that the acquisition of the land under the amendment was within the scope of the
public purpose doctrine because the redevelopment of the land sought to eliminate economic,
social, and physical blight. Id. at 611-14, 111 N.E.2d at 633-34.
56. 68 Ill. 2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977). In Paley, the City of Urbana's plan to eliminate
urban blight through the expansion of the Lincoln Square Mall was challenged on constitutional
grounds. It was contended that the commercial revitalization of the downtown area constituted
a public expenditure for a private purpose. To the contrary, the court held that commercial and
economic stimulation are within the scope of the public purpose doctrine since the elimination of
commercial and economic stagnation benefits the public in general. Id. at 74-75, 368 N.E.2d at
920-21. As stated by the court in Paley:
[T]oday's decision denotes that the application of the public-purpose doctrine to
sanction urban redevelopment can no longer be restricted to areas where crime,
vacancy, or physical decay produce undesirable living conditions or imperil public
health. Stimulation of commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation are
also objectives which enhance the public weal.
Id.
57. 79 Ill. 2d at 363, 403 N.E.2d at 245.
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district.5 Because the elimination of blighted conditions is a valid public
purpose, the allocation was held constitutional. 
5
Additionally, the Crouch majority noted that the legislature may compel a
municipal corporation,6 0 as an agent of the state, to perform any duty that
promotes the state's general welfare, even if such performance creates a debt
payable from local tax revenue."' Because redevelopment enhances the
"welfare" of the state, the court held that the allocation of tax revenue to the
municipality constituted a proper public purpose.6 2  Further, this type of
revenue sharing was constitutional because it was incorporated specifically
into the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
6 3
Finally, the court held that benefits to private commercial developers
resulting from public funding of the redevelopment project did not render
the Act unconstitutional. The court reasoned that as long as the "principal
purpose" of an enactment is public in nature, incidental benefits to private
parties are irrelevant.6 4  The court determined that the participation of
58. Id. at 364, 403 N.E.2d at 246.
59. Id.
60. Id. In this passage the court in Crouch was quoting from People ex rel. Sanitary Dist. v.
Schlaeger, 391 Ill. 314, 63 N.E.2d 382 (1945). The court in Schlaeger apparently used the term
"municipal corporation" to include local taxing districts. However, "municipal corporation" is
usually construed to mean only cities, towns, or villages. Local taxing districts are generally
considered to be "quasi-municipal corporations." 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 17, § 2.23 (3d ed.
1971).
61. 79 Ill. 2d at 364-66, 403 N.E. 2d at 246-47 (quoting People ex rel. Sanitary District v.
Schlaeger, 391 Ill. 314, 324-25, 63 N.E.2d 382, 388 (1945)).
62. Id. The legislature has broad authority to control the distribution of tax revenue as long
as the distribution is for a public purpose. 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 17, § 44.186 (3d ed. 1979).
63. 79 Ill. 2d at 366, 403 N.E.2d at 247. The Illinois Constitution provides:
SECTION 10. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
(a) Units of local government and school districts may contract or otherwise
associate among themselves, with the State, with other states and their units of local
government and school districts, and with the United States to obtain or share
services and to exercise, combine, or transfer any power or function, in any manner
not prohibited by law or ordinance. Units of local government and school districts
may contract and otherwise associate with individuals, associations, and corpora-
tions in any manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance. Participating units of
government may use their credit, revenues, and other resources to pay costs and to
service debt related to intergovernmental activities.
ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 10(a).
64. 79 I11. 2d at 368-69, 403 N.E.2d at 248. Accord, People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley,
68 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76, 368 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1977) (downtown redevelopment was held to be
primarily a public purpose even though some benefits accrued to private developers); People ex
rel. City of Salem v. McMakin, 53 Ill. 2d 347. 355, 291 N.E.2d 807, 812-13 (1972) (basic
objective of industrial development was public in nature regardless of incidental benefits to
private developers); People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Auth., 14 Ill. 2d 230,
236, 151 N.E.2d 311, 315 (1958) (redevelopment of railroad terminals constituted an appropri-
ate public purpose despite collateral benefits to private developers); People ex rel. Gutknecht v.
City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 611-14, 111 N.E.2d 626, 633-37 (1953) (acquisition of vacant land
for subsequent resale to private developers was held to constitute a public purpose); Poole v. City
of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 530, 94 N.E.2d 416, 421 (1950) (construction of a parking facility was
held to be primarily for a public purpose); Cremer v. Peoria Hous. Auth., 399 111. 579, 591-92,
78 N.E.2d 276, 283 (1948) (slum clearance was predominantly a public purpose).
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private commercial developers was essential to the plan's success, although
the Act was not passed primarily for the benefit of private developers.6 5
Thus, the court concluded that the allocation of tax increments did constitute
an expenditure for a public purpose.""
In response to the second issue-whether the taxation scheme was an
improper diversion of tax revenue from the taxing districts to the municipal-
ity-the court emphasized again that tax revenue sharing among local gov-
ernmental units was specifically provided for in the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion.6 7 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that the legislature possesses
broad discretionary power to establish classifications defining the objects of
taxation. 8 These classifications are constitutional, provided they bear some
reasonable relationship to the object of the taxation. 6 Since tax increments
reasonably may be used to retire the debt created by the redevelopment plan,
the court held that the tax increment allocation scheme did not violate the
constitution. 70
Moreover, the court rejected the argument that the Act taxes residents of
taxing districts which are participating in the redevelopment project at a rate
greater than residents of non-participating districts. 7' Because only taxing
districts that actually have increased property tax revenue as a result of the
redevelopment allocate their tax increment, the court reasoned that only
taxpayers who directly benefit from the redevelopment project pay towards
its cost. 72 Therefore, the court concluded that the tax increment allocation
scheme was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and did not violate due
process, equal protection, or uniformity.7 3
ANALYSIS OF CROUCH
Ultimately, the controversy in Crouch turned on the constitutionality of
the tax increment allocation scheme. The dissenting opinion in Crouch ar-
gued that this scheme conflicted with the constitutional prohibition against
65. 79 I11. 2d at 368-69, 403 N.E.2d at 248.
66. Id. at 369, 403 N.E.2d at 248.
67. Id. See note 63 supra for the relevant portion of the Illinois Constitution.
68. 79 Ill. 2d at 370, 403 N.E.2d at 248-49. The legislature's power to establish classifica-
tions defining objects of taxation refers to the legislature's ability to determine exactly which
property within the state will be taxed and at what rate. 16 McQUILLIN, supra note 17, § 44.20
(3d ed. 1979).
69. 79 Ill. 2d at 370, 403 N.E.2d at 248-49. Accord, Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City
of Peoria, 77 Ill. 2d 491, 495-96, 397 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1979) (the exclusion of not-for-profit
organizations from amusement tax was not arbitrary or unreasonable); Williams v. City of
Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 423, 432-33, 362 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (1977) (lower transaction tax rates for
non-residents of Chicago was not arbitrary or unreasonable); 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 17, §
44.20 (3d ed. 1979).
70. 79 I11. 2d at 370-71, 403 N.E.2d at 249. The court noted at this point that its sole
function was to determine the constitutionality of the act in question. Thus, the court refrained
from commenting on the advisability or utility of the Act. Id. at 369-70, 403 N.E.2d at 248.
71. Id. at 371, 403 N.E.2d at 249.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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forcing one unit of government to pay for debts it did not incur or for the
corporate purpose of another unit.14 Although this argument may appear to
have merit, the majority in Crouch was justified in upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Act because the tax increment allocation scheme did not
require an improper diversion of tax revenue.
Article VII, section 10(a) of the Illinois Constitution provides that local
governmental units and school districts may contract among themselves to
obtain needed services. 75  The court in Crouch utilized this section as one of
the principal justifications for approving the tax increment allocation
scheme. 7  But, it was not the intent of this section to sanction the manda-
tory transfer of revenue. As noted by the dissenting opinion in Crouch, the
formal explanation to section 10 indicates that its purpose was to allow the
sharing of revenue rather than the outright transfer of it.77 Even if it can be
construed to permit the transfer of funds among units of government,7 8
section 10 was clearly designed to sanction voluntary agreements, not man-
datory arrangements as provided in the Act.7 9
Yet, the fact that section 10 was not intended to be applicable to the tax
increment allocation scheme is not necessarily fatal to the Act. The Act must,
however, comply with the constitutional requirements for the collection and
distribution of property tax revenue. The Illinois Constitution requires prop-
erty tax revenue to be collected with uniformity80 and to be expended for a
public purpose."
In order for property tax revenue to be collected with uniformity, there
must be equality in the burden of taxation.8 2  This equality is achieved
74. Id. at 378-82, 403 N.E.2d at 253-54 (Clark & Moran, JJ., dissenting).
75. See note 63 supra for the text of this provision of the Illinois Constitution.
76. 79 Ill. 2d at 369, 403 N.E.2d at 248.
77. Id. at 381, 403 N.E.2d at 254. The official explanation of section 10 states: "This section
is new. It permits government at all levels to cooperate in working out common problems. Thus,
one local government can contract with another government or private parties to share services
and divide the costs equitably." 7 RECORD OF PROcEEDINGS, SIXrH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 2730 (1970).
78. The discussion of section 10 at the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention raised' the
issue of whether it prohibited the transfer, rather than the sharing, of funds between governmen-
tal units. It was decided that section 10 did not prohibit such a transfer. 4 RECORD OF PROCEED-
INGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3423 (1970).
79. During the discussion of section 10 at the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, it was
stated: "What is intergovernmental cooperation? Well, it is a voluntary participation to con-
tract, to agree, to cooperate, to associate at all levels of government." Id. at 3421 (emphasis
added).
80. "Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property shall be levied
uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law." ILL. CONST.
art. IX, § 4(a).
81. "Public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public purposes." ILL. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1(a).
82. See Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 515 (1916) (franchise tax held
to be discriminatory); Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 Ill. 25, 42, 95 N.E.2d 84, 92 (1950) (amenda-
tory act creating the office of county assessment supervisor and appropriations act providing for
the payment of their salaries held to be unconstitutional); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 327
Ill. 590, 601, 158 N.E. 849, 853 (1927) (property tax held to be non-discriminatory).
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through equality in the rate of taxation and the mode of assessment.8 3 Tax
increment financing does not alter the uniform collection of tax revenue
because the property within the redevelopment project area is still taxed at
the same rate and assessed in the same manner as the property in the rest of
the municipality.84 Thus, the tax increment allocation scheme does not
violate uniformity.
The adoption of tax increment financing does, however, alter the uniform
distribution of property tax revenue. Tax increment financing freezes the
amount of revenue distributed to the taxing districts at the pre-plan level and
allocates all the revenue in excess of that amount to the municipality.85 But,
this in itself does not render tax increment financing unconstitutional be-
cause uniformity is required only in the collection of tax revenue, not in its
distribution. 8
The constitutional requirement that public funds be expended for public
purposes has been construed broadly to include any expenditure which pri-
marily enhances "the general well-being of society and the happiness and
prosperity of the people."87 As stated in Crouch, it is well settled that the
elimination of blighted conditions enhances the well being of society.88
Therefore, the tax increment allocation scheme constitutes an expenditure
for a public purpose because the redevelopment seeks to eliminate blighted
conditions.
The dissenting opinion in Crouch argued that the tax increment allocation
scheme was unconstitutional because it forced the taxing districts to expend
tax revenue for the corporate purpose of another governmental unit-the
City of Canton.8" To illustrate its argument, the dissent cited Flynn v.
Kucharski.90 In Flynn, township collectors received a two percent commis-
sion upon the total amount of Cook County property taxes that they col-
lected from suburban Cook County residents before transferring the revenue
83. "Uniformity in taxation, as required by the constitution, implies equality in the burden
of taxation, and this equality in burden cannot exist without uniformity in the mode of assess-
ment as well as the rate of taxation." Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 I11. 25, 42, 95 N.E.2d 84, 92
(1950). Accord, Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 515 (1916); Hanover Fire
Ins. Co. v. Harding, 327 I11. 590, 601, 158 N.E. 849, 853 (1927).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-74.4-.8 (1979).
85. See notes 33-34 supra.
86. According to the Illinois Supreme Court,
[t]he rule to be gathered from the cases decided in States which likewise have the
constitutional limitation of uniformity, is that lack of uniformity in the imposition of
tax is fatal to the levy, but if the tax is imposed with equality and uniformity and
collected for the public welfare, the rule does not apply to inequality of distribution.
Board of Library Directors v. City of Lake Forest, 17 Ill. 2d 277, 282, 161 N.E.2d 272, 276
(1959).
87. Hagler v. Small, 307 Ill. 460, 474, 138 N.E. 849, 854 (1923) (compensation for veterans
held to be an expenditure for a public purpose), quoted in People ex rel. City of Salem v.
McMakin, 53 Ill. 2d 347, 357, 291 N.E.2d 807, 814 (1972).
88. See note 55 supra.
89. 79 I11. 2d at 379-81, 403 N.E.2d at 253-54.
90. 45 Ill. 2d 211, 258 N.E.2d 329 (1970).
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to the county collector."' The Flynn court held that the two percent com-
mission paid to the township collectors constituted a diversion of tax revenue
from the county to the township.9 2 Flynn concluded that the taxation
scheme was unconstitutional because the revenue collected for the county
was expended for the corporate purpose of the township. 3
Flynn is inapplicable to the tax increment allocation scheme because it was
decided under the 1870 Illinois Constitution.9 4 That constitution provided
that funds collected by a municipal corporation must be spent for its own
corporate purpose.9 5 When Illinois ratified a new constitution in 1970, °" the
provision pertaining to the expenditure of corporate funds was eliminated.
Instead, the 1970 Illinois Constitution required only that public funds be
expended for public purposes. 7 Because the elimination of blighted condi-
tions was found to constitute a public purpose, there was no additional
requirement that funds be expended for a corporate purpose.
Since the tax increment allocation scheme established in the Act satisfies
the constitutional requirements of uniformity and public purpose, the court
in Crouch correctly concluded that the Act did not constitute an improper
diversion of tax revenue among units of local government. Moreover, the
court's decision in Crouch was consistent with other jurisdictions which have
ruled on the constitutionality of tax increment financing.98 Thus, the court
was completely justified in declaring the Act to be constitutional.
91. Id. at 213-14, 258 N.E.2d 329, 330. Suburban residents could pay their property taxes to
either the township or county collector, but the residents of Chicago had to pay their property
taxes to the county collector. Id.
92. Id. at 219-20, 258 N.E.2d at 333-34.
93. Id.
94. Flynn was decided March 17, 1970. The 1970 Illinois Constitution, however, did not
become generally effective until July 1, 1971. People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMakin, 53 Ill. 2d
347, 354, 29.1 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972).
95. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1870). See also Board of Library Directors v. City of Lake
Forest, 17 Ill. 2d 277, 161 N.E.2d 272 (1959). The court in Library Directors stated that "[t]he
prohibition of the constitution is that one municipality may not force another to levy taxes to pay
a debt which it did not incur or for the corporate purpose of the other municipality." Id. at 286,
161 N.E.2d at 278.
96. The 1970 Illinois Constitution was ratified on December 15, 1970. People ex rel. City of
Salem v. McMakin, 53 II. 2d 347, 354, 291 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972).
97. ILL. CONST. art VIII, § 1(a). For the text of this provision of the Illinois Constitution, see
note 81 supra.
98. Of the many jurisdictions which have ruled on the constitutionality of tax increment
financing, only Kentucky has held it unconstitutional. The Kentucky Constitution provides that
revenue collected for education cannot be expended for any other purpose. Ky. CONST. § 184. In
Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976), the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the Kentucky Tax Increment Act was unconstitutional, because it attempted to allocate
taxes which were levied for education for other purposes. Id. at 5. Because the Illinois Constitu-
tion does not contain a statutory provision similar to that in Kentucky, Miller is therefore clearly
distinguishable from Crouch.
In Richards v..City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975), the Iowa Supreme Court held
that tax increment financing comported with the constitutional requirements of due process,
equal protection, and delegation of legislative authority. However, the court prohibited the
section of an urban renewal act that exempted tax increment bonds from statutory debt limita-
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TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN PERSPECTIVE
Canton was confronted with the problem of obsolete and deteriorated
physical structures in a once thriving downtown section of the city 9-a
typical problem faced by municipalities throughout Illinois. These cities find
it increasingly more difficult to retain old commerce and industry, and to
attract new business because facilities comparable to those in suburban or
previously undeveloped rural areas are unavailable. 00 As commerce and
industry flee these municipalities, the tax base decreases, forcing correspond-
ing reductions in municipal services. By reaffirming the expansion of the
tions. Id. at 64. Richards emphasized that, even though a tax allocation fund was established,
the bonds were to be repaid from the general revenue of the city. Id. Since the city pledged part
of its general revenue towards the repayment of the bonds, the resulting obligations had to meet
the debt limitation imposed on the city. Thus, the court held that the tax increment bonds were
valid, but only to the amount of the debt limit. Id. at 66.
Other jurisdictions, however, have been completely supportive of tax increment financing. In
Tennessee, for example the state statute authorizing tax increment financing was challenged on
the grounds of public purpose, unauthorized lending of public credit, uniformity, due process,
and equal protection. Metropolitan Dev. & Hous. Auth. v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn.
1979). The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the statute was constitutionally sound in all
respects. Id. at 428. The court emphasized that the tax increment bonds did not constitute
lending of the public credit because only the local housing authority was liable for the repayment
of the bonds. Id. at 429. Moreover, the court stated that the tax increment allocation scheme was
not an unconstitutional diversion of tax revenue because the allocation was just a means of
appropriating revenue, equal to the amount of the increment, to pay for redevelopment costs.
Id. at 430.
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that its tax increment financing statute com-
plied with the public purpose doctrine and uniformity. Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House
Corp. v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288 N.W.2d 85 (1980). The court stressed that
under tax increment financing local governmental units are not forced to pay over revenue to
which they are otherwise entitled because the revenue would not have been collected but for the
redevelopment project. Id. at 414, 288 N.W.2d at 95. Finally, in R.E. Short Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
construction of a parking ramp by the city intended to induce a private developer to build a hotel
complex on the adjoining property was within the scope of the public purpose doctrine. These
developments were planned in connection with a redevelopment project which utilized tax
increment financing. The court concluded that the benefits to the private developer were
outweighed by the benefits to the entire community from a successful redevelopment project. Id.
at 336-41.
See also State ex rel. Schneider v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 115, 605 P.2d 556 (1980) (tax
increment upheld on the basis of uniformity); City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980)
(tax increment financing upheld on the grounds of uniformity and lawful delegation of legisla-
tive authority); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975) (tax increment
financing upheld on the basis of the public purpose doctrine).
Thus, it appears that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Crouch upholding the
constitutionality of tax increment financing is consistent with decisions of other jurisdictions
which have ruled on the issue.
99. For an explanation of the physical conditions in Canton, see notes 37-43 and accompany-
ing text supra.
100. In Canton, the downtown area was not able to adjust to consumers' demands for modern
shopping facilities. As a result, consumers patronized modern stores in other locations. Hender-
son, supra note 1, at 18.
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public purpose doctrine and by upholding tax increment financing, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Crouch has provided Illinois municipalities with
an effective tool to reverse this trend.
Expansion of the public purpose doctrine to include commercial and eco-
nomic revitalization enables a municipality to employ a wide range of crea-
tivity and flexibility in its redevelopment plans. 10 1 Thus, community rede-
velopment is no longer limited solely to slum clearance. A community
redevelopment plan may encompass various types of projects, from shopping
centers, office complexes and hotels to low or middle income housing."0 2 As
a result, a community may choose the particular project, or combination of
projects, which will best accommodate its particular needs.
Tax increment financing provides a municipality with significant ad-
vantages unavailable through other methods of funding community rede-
velopment. While tax increment financing permits local control by the mu-
nicipality or the redevelopment agency, 10 3 it does not raise tax rates or invest
current tax revenue. 0 4  Local control means that the funds can be used
flexibly to adjust the redevelopment plan to the needs of a particular area'05
or to encourage private investment in a development that otherwise would
be prohibitively expensive.10  This private investment increases the tax base,
which in turn provides added revenue for the taxing districts after the project
costs have been paid. 10 7 Local control also allows the funds to be employed
101. After People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 68 I11. 2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977), one
commentator stated:
The Urbana decision is broad authority for innovative efforts by municipalities to
stimulate commercial development or redevelopment. Increasingly cities have found
that successful downtown redevelopment progress requires a level of municipal
participation that only 10 or 15 years ago would have been thought unacceptable. In
aid of commercial or industrial redevelopment, several cities have actively entered
the real estate market to undertake projects that were not economically feasible for
private enterprise or in order to secure important public objectives.
Note, Municipal Authority to Stimulate Commercial Growth and Arrest Economic Stagnation:
People ex rel. Urbana v. Paley, 41B NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REV. 319, 329 (1978).
102. COUNCiL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 12, at 6.
103. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 229.
104. Henderson, supra note 1, at 16; Urban Redevelopment, supra note 12, at 540.
105. Due to the expansion of the public purpose doctrine, various types of redevelopment
plans are available to communities. Thus, communities are able to plan redevelopment in order
to meet their needs. For an explanation on the expansion of the public purpose doctrine, see
notes 100-01 and accompanying text supra.
106. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 12, at 1. According to the Council:
The municipal TIF (tax increment financing) authority may buy the land to be
developed, prepare it by demolishing existing buildings or other action, then sell
land to a developer at a financial loss. This may be done in order to encourage
developers to become involved in what might otherwise be a prohibitively expensive
development.
id.
107. See, Nebel, Chicago Redevelopment Can Succeed, 12TH ANN. METROPOLITAN CHIcAGo
INDUs./Com. DEv. GUIDE, July, 1978, at 86; Urban Redevelopment, supra note 12, at 541.
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quickly to halt the spread of blight, °8 in sharp contrast to federal programs
which are often plagued by red tape and delay. 0
Perhaps the most significant aspect of tax increment financing is its use in
conjunction with other sources of redevelopment funds. 0 Although it is not
always the most appropriate method of financing every redevelopment proj-
ect,"' the use of tax increment funds to revitalize one area may be the
turning point in the overall redevelopment plan and lead to the successful
renewal of the entire community.
Critics of tax increment financing, however, contend that vesting broad
discretionary power in the local governing body will lead to an abuse of
authority." 2 Since voter approval is not required for the passage of redevel-
opment ordinances, the redevelopment agency has virtually uncontrolled
power to establish a plan and commit a significant portion of future tax
revenue to the repayment of project costs." 3 In addition, the need for tax
increments encourages inclusion of property that is attractive to private
investment rather than property which is merely blighted." 4 Moreover,
108. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 229. According to Mitchell:
Local government makes the decision to use tax increment and decides what it shall
be used for (within the state statutory enabling legislative authority). This local
autonomy makes it possible for local government to move rapidly and precisely to
the solution of specific problems, without waiting for external approvals from state
or federal officials.
Id.
109. Davidson, supra note 1, at 408.
110. For example, the City of Canton is using tax increment financing to fund only part of its
total redevelopment cost. Canton's other sources of revenue for redevelopment are a grant from
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, a loan by the Local Devel-
opment Corporation, and the issuance of tax-exempt commercial redevelopment bonds. Hender-
son, supra note 1, at 18. Another example is Hopkins, Minnesota. The city built an eleven-story
apartment complex and a senior citizen housing complex by using tax increment financing to
raise the local share of a federally-funded program. Swick, supra note 12, at 52.
For a general discussion on the sources of redevelopment funds available from federal, state,
and local government, see LAR, supra note 1, at 49-60.
111. Tax increment financing is not appropriate in situations where the redevelopment
project area is unable to generate sufficient tax increment revenue to pay for redevelopment costs
or obligations as they come due. See Nebel & Teplitz, supra note 12, at 7.
112. Davidson, supra note 1, at 408.
113. Jefferson & Taggart, supra note 12, at 5. The authors stated:
According to [one commentator], "the most significant feature of tax allocation
bonds is that they can be issued and refunded without the requirement of voter
approval." This is to say that redevelopment authorities-and not the voters-can
obligate significant chunks of a municipality's future revenue to an urban renewal
project. The issue that [this commentator] avoids is whether the fundamental pre-
rogative of committing tax dollars ought to be delegated to a single-purpose author-
ity whose primary mission is to maximize urban renewal activity.
Id.
114. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 12, at 4. The Council pointed out that
[c]ritics of TIF argue that the system's proponents often make unwarranted .assump-
tions about increases in the tax base due to development. It may be argued that
redevelopment activity would have occurred in the area without the TIF program,
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some critics allege that tax increment financing results in additional munici-
pal services and expenses to accommodate the increase in commercial and
industrial activity." 5
To the contrary, tax increment financing does not necessarily require
additional municipal services because substandard property often demands
more public services than properly maintained property.'", Other potential
infirmities of tax increment financing may be avoided through carefully
drafted statutes. For example, a redevelopment project in Illinois cannot be
established solely to snare large tax increments because of safeguards in the
Act. These safeguards include requirements that a blighted or conservation
area exist," 7 that redevelopment will not occur without public assistance," 8
and that revitalization conforms to the development of the entire commu-
nity."19  Additionally, the detailed provisions for notice'2 0 and public hear-
ings' 2' ensure that those affected by the proposed redevelopment are ade-
quately informed and afforded the opportunity to object to the
redevelopment plan.
in which case the municipality has wasted money on an unnecessary project. Or, it
may be that cities using TIF have an incentive to include nonblighted areas of
certain growth in the project in order to ensure that the increment will materialize.
If this occurs there is no way to link the increased tax base causally to tax increment
financing.
Id. Accord, Jefferson & Taggart, supra note 12, at 6.
115. Jefferson & Taggart, supra note 12, at 5-6. These critics opined that
a more significant flaw in the "frozen base roll" concept is its failure to account for
increased municipal expenses imposed by higher density commercial and industrial
uses, which, by definition, accompany tax increment-financed projects. The effect
of this scheme is to delude the public into believing that urban renewal pays for itself
through an arbitrarily-established tax increment without simultaneously taking into
account the cost increment for new facilities and services.
Id.
116. Swick, supra note 12, at 52. That commentator stated:
The premise that tax increment fails to account for increased municipal costs is
grossly overstated, if you consider the community as a whole and the cost of
alternatives. While theoretically the city tax base may expand or erode, overwhelm-
ing evidence shows that central cities in this country are eroding far faster than they
are expanding.
Many rundown areas disproportionately require more services-for example, po-
lice and fire services-while if the property was renewed it would decrease these
extra needs. Using this criterion, several projects would not have the alleged signifi-
cant increased need for municipal services.
id.
117. See notes 18-20 supra.
118. See note 21 supra.
119. See note 24 supra.
120. See notes 25 & 26 supra.
121. Id. Another safeguard contained in the Act is the provision which requires surplus funds
acquired through tax increment financing to be distributed annually to the taxing districts. See
note 34 and accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
By upholding the constitutionality of tax increment financing, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Crouch sanctioned a new source of funds for community
redevelopment. These funds are needed by communities throughout Illinois
which, like Canton, suffer from antiquated physical structures and stagnant
business districts.1 22  The flexibility of tax increment financing in conjunc-
tion with the expansion of the public purpose doctrine allows a community
to choose from a wide range of redevelopment projects and formulate the
redevelopment plan best suited to its needs. Revitalization will draw people,
commerce, and industry back to the community. The additional private
investment increases the tax base and ensures a strong community in the
future.
Michael L. Molinaro
122. Peoria, Rockford, Rosemont, Homewood, and Danville have passed the requisite ordi-
nances to implement tax increment financing. Henderson, supra note 1, at 17.
